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1 Introduction 
No other species besides Homo sapiens has developed in the course of its 
evolutionary history a system of communication in which a finite set of symbols 
together with a series of principles for their combination allows an infinite set of 
expressions to be generated. This system of natural language enables members of 
our species to externalize and exchange thoughts within the social group, and, 
through the invention of writing systems, within society at large. Speech and 
language are effective means for the management of social cohesion in societies 
where the group size no longer allows this to be done by grooming, which is the 
preferred way of bonding in our genetic neighbors, the old world primates.1 
The generative power of the human language system rests on its tripartite 
architecture.2 In this architecture, language-relevant information is encoded in at 
least three distinct representational formats: one for meaning, one for syntax, and one 
for the sound structures of words and utterances. Through the process of mapping 
these representational structures onto each other, the conceptual structures that 
specify the content of the speaker's message are expressed as a linear sequence of 
speech sounds (speaking). Alternatively, during listening to speech conceptual 
structures are derived from a linear string of speech sounds. In this mapping process, 
combining units into hierarchical phrase structures (syntax) is the necessary link 
between conceptual structures and phonological (or sound) structures. 
In the division of labor between the sciences investigating the human language 
faculty, it is the task of the linguist to specify the representational structures involved, 
and it is the task of the psycholinguist to investigate how these structures are 
accessed and exploited during listening and speaking. Finally, the cognitive 
neuroscientist is faced with the challenge of specifying how the brain enables human 
language, and of determining the spatio-temporal profile of neurophysiological 
activity underlying speaking (writing) and listening (reading). 
In order to get a more precise picture of what these different sciences reveal 
about the human language faculty, we first have to specify what the overarching term 
"human language faculty" stands for. It refers to the collection of the following set 
of complex, related but at the same time distinct skills: speaking and listening, 
reading and writing, and in communities of the deaf, using sign language. Each of 
these skills requires that distinct representational structures in memory are accessed 
and exploited in real time. The cognitive architectures for these skills specify which 
1 Robin Dunbar, Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution of 'Language (London Faberand 
Faber, 1996), Willem J M. Levelt, "Producing Spoken Language: A Blueprint of the 
Speaker," in Neurocognition of Language, Colin M Brown and Peter Hagoort, eds. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 83-122. 
2 Ray Jackendoff, The Architecture of the Language Faculty (Cambridge: MIT Press. 
1997), idem, "The Representational Structures of the language Facul!> and Their 
Interactions," in Neurocognition of Language, Brown and Hagoort. eds . " SI 
representational structures are involved and how these are operated on in real time. 
The neural architectures specify the ways in which these skills are instantiated in the 
wetware of the human brain. However, one should keep in mind that the distinction 
between the cognitive architecture and the neural architecture is an idealization. As 
a first approximation, it is useful to make a distinction between computations in 
symbolic terms (cognitive architecture) and in neurophysiological terms (neural 
architecture), but in a complete cognitive neuroscience of language these levels 
should be brought together. 
In the remainder of this essay I will first discuss the cognitive architecture for one 
of these skills in more detail. I will then discuss the neural architecture. Finally, I 
draw some implications for a theory of the person. 
2 The Cognitive Architecture 
A central component of our language skills is the mental lexicon. The mental lexicon 
is the part of declarative memory specifying the knowledge that a language user has 
about the words of his or her native language. It is estimated that speakers of a 
language have an active vocabulary of at least 40,000 words.3 For these words, 
speakers know what they mean and how they sound. In addition, they know the 
syntactic properties of words such as word class (noun, verb, etc.). All this lexical 
information is retrieved very quickly from memory. On average a speaker produces 
two or three words per second. This requires not only the retrieval of different 
sources of word information, but also the coordinated activation of a large ensemble 
of muscles involved in articulating speech. About 100 muscles are involved in 
speaking, whose innervation has to be coordinated with millisecond precision. 
Despite the complexity and speed of this cognitive activity, speakers are very 
accurate, and, on average, make less than one error in 1000 words. The occasional 
speech errors are nevertheless very informative about the architecture of the speech 
process For instance, sounds can be exchanged between different words as in "Aeft 
/emisphere" (instead of "left hemisphere"),4 or can be produced too early as in 
anticipations ("it's a weal mystery" instead of "it's a real mystery").5 What these 
examples of speech errors illustrate is that words are not stored in memory as units, 
but have to be assembled from the constituting phonemes every time we produce a 
word This assembly process occasionally goes wrong, resulting in sounds ending 
up in the environment of the wrong word. 
Figure 1 presents a blueprint for speaking single words. It specifies what 
happens between the moment that we recognize a particular retinal image as, say, 
John Paul II, and the actual articulation of the sound stream "pope." 
Speaking starts with specifying the conceptual content of the utterance. This 
specification can be determined by visual input as in our example. But in many cases 
the conceptual specification is determined by internal input, for example, the 
speaker's intention to express a certain idea. Whatever triggers the conceptual 
specification of the utterance, the speaker has to select a particular concept or series 
of concepts from the knowledge base in memory, and s/he has to select and decide 
] For a general introduction to the mental lexicon, see Jean Aitchison, Words in the Mind: 
An Introduction to the Mental Lexicon (Oxford Basil Blackwell, 1987). 
4 Victoria A. Fromkin, ed , Speech Errors as Linguistic Evidence (The Hague- Mouton 
1973). 
5 Ibid. 
about the way of expressing (for example, a message can be expressed as a 
statement, but also as a question, with or without irony, etc.). For instance, in our 
example the speaker can decide to say "John Paul the Second" or "the pope," to 
mention just two possible alternatives. 
The conceptual selection and specification process precedes the actual 
formulation process in which preverbal conceptual structures trigger the retrieval of 
linguistic structures necessary to express the idea as a series of speech sounds Here, 
two completely different types of linguistic information need to be retrieved, one 
specifying the characteristics of the word sound, the other concerning the grammati-
cal properties of a word. 
Each word form in the mental lexicon is associated with syntactic word 
information.6 This latter type of information is referred to as lemma information 
Lemmas specify the syntactic properties of words, such as their word class (noun, 
verb, adjective, etc.). For nouns in gender-marked languages their grammatical 
gender is specified as well (e.g., horse in French has masculine gender, in Dutch it 
has neuter gender). Verb lemmas contain information on syntactic frames (the 
argument structures), and on the thematic roles of the syntactic arguments (the 
thematic structure). For instance, the lemma for the verb donate specifies that it 
requires a noun-phrase (NP) as the grammatical subject, an NP as the grammatical 
object, with the optional addition of a prepositional phrase (PP) as the indirect object 
(e.g., John <subject-NP> donates a book <direct object-NP> to the library 
<optional indirect object-PP>). In addition, the mapping of this syntactic frame onto 
the thematic roles is specified. For donate the subject is the actor, the direct object 
the theme, and the indirect object the goal of the action expressed by the predicate 
In the next phase of the formulation process, the selection of the appropriate 
lemmas trigger the retrieval of sound pattern of the utterance (see figure 1). During 
this phase, the speech sounds (phonemes) of the word become available. In addition 
to the phonemes, a word's metrical information is retrieved, specifying the number 
of syllables and the stress pattern (not shown in figure 1). In a processing step known 
as phonological encoding, the phonemes are assigned to their syllable positions in 
a left-to-right order. The outcome of phonological encoding is a "phonological 
word," containing the word-sound information as a sequence of syllables with the 
right stress pattern. Syllables are the codes that form the basis for the articulator} 
movements of the vocal cords, the velum, the tongue, the jaw and the lips. These arc 
abstract codes, since they are independent of the starting positions of, for instance, 
the lips and the tongue. Speaking with or without a pipe in the mouth results in 
different articulation movement trajectories, which are nevertheless instructed by the 
same abstract syllable codes. The final outcome of this whole cascade of retrieval 
and activation processes is an acoustic signal that the listener uses to derive the 
intended message. 
Apart from the experimental evidence for a distinction between the retrieval of 
lemma- and word-form information, we are all familiar with a phenomenon 
supporting this distinction. This is the so-called tip-of-the-tongue state, referring to 
the often embarrassing situation in which we know that we know the word, we even 
6 Willem J.M. Levelt, Speaking: From Intention to Articulation (Cambridge: MIT Press. 
1989); idem, "Producing Spoken Language: A Blueprint of the Speaker". Ardi Roelofs. "'A 
Spreading-activation Theory of Lemma Retneval in Speaking." Cognition 42 (1992) 107 42. 
idem, "Testing a Non-decompositional Theory of Lemma Retrieval in Speaking Retrieval ot 
Verbs," Cognition 47 (1993): 59 87 
know that it is, say, a noun with a particular grammatical gender (for example, 
neuter), but for some reason the retrieval of the sound form is hampered. The fact 
that we can access some aspect of word information but fail to retrieve others 
illustrates the idea that different aspects of word information are differentially stored 
visual form 
Figure I. The Levelt and Roelofs model for speaking single words |see Willem 
j.M Levelt, Speaking From Intention to Articulation (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 
Ardi Roelofs, "A Spreading activation Theory of Lemma Retrieval in Speaking," 
Cognition 42 (I992)|. Concept nodes (POPE) are activated on the basis of 
sensory and/or conceptual input Activation from a concept node spreads to its 
lemma node (pope) in the mental lexicon In addition, activation of POPE 
results in increased activation of related concepts in semantic memo7, such as 
for instance PRIES! Each concept node is linked to exactly one lemma in the 
lexicon At the lemma level the syntactic word information is specified, such as 
grammatical gender and word category For instance, in Italian the gender of the 
lemma pope is masculine (// papa), whereas the gender of, for example, the 
Italian lemma for church is feminine Ua chiesa). After the lemma has been 
selected, word form information is retrieved and prepared for articulation, 
and retrieved. The simplistic idea that words are units to be found somewhere in the 
brain is simply wrong. "Word" is just nothing more than a handy catch phrase for an 
orchestra of information with players of different instruments Despite differences 
in the details of various models of speaking, there is general agreement among 
researchers of language processing that it requires the temporally orchestrated 
retrieval of the different types of information discussed above 
The way in which I discussed the process of speaking thus far is as a feedforward 
process from intention to articulation.7 However, mtrospectively we often have the 
feeling that our way of expressing our thoughts sharpens and molds our intentions 
That is, speech starts with an intention, but intentions are also (partly) derived from 
speech. This intuition has led to criticisms of an account that sees speech as the 
information flow from intention to articulation.8 However, in my view this criticism 
can be dealt with easily if we realize that as speakers we are also at the same time 
listeners. That is, we listen to our own speech, using the same machinery that 
analyses the speech of others. In the listening process we derive the intention from 
the speech sounds that hit our ears. Speaking is a highly incremental process, which 
means that we have not specified all the details of our preverbal message before we 
start the formulation process. The incremental nature of speech planning opens a 
window of opportunity in which listening to our own speech can further shape and 
mold our intentions, and via this route influence the ongoing formulation process. 
Given that our cognitive machinery of language includes both production and 
comprehension, it instantiates a continuous internal dialogue between "speaker" and 
"listener" resulting in the introspective feeling that intentions are not only the source 
but also the by-product of speaking. 
In the example above I have given the rough outlines of the cognitive architec-
ture of speaking, mainly restricted to speaking single words. A full-blown model of 
speaking specifies additionally how words are combined into longer utterances, how 
the mtonational contours of multi-word utterances are determined, etc. Similar 
blueprints can be made for listening, reading, and writing.Q In all these cases, 
establishing the details of the cognitive architectures for the different language skills 
is based on a combination of conceptual analysis, computational modeling, and 
clever experimentation. With the cognitive architectures in hand we can ask sensible 
questions about the neural instantiation of the different language skills Without such 
explicit models, the study of the neural mechanisms of language is doomed to tail 
As an example of science in action, I will discuss one simple experiment in some 
detail. If lexical concepts such as POPF. and PRIEST are stored in a network-like 
way as shown above in figure 1, and if the activation of a particular concept partly 
spreads to nearby concept nodes in the network, this would predict certain 
processing consequences for words that are preceded by semantically related words 
This is tested in the following way Participants in the experiment see word pairs that 
are flashed on a computer screen. First, one word is flashed on the screen lor halt a 
second, followed by a few hundred milliseconds blank screen. Then the target word 
is flashed on the screen for half a second. The participants are instructed to read 
aloud this second word as soon as it appears on the screen The presentation ot the 
Levelt, Speaking 
8 Cf. Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston. Mass little, Brown and 
Company, 1991). 
9 For detailed examnlcv. sec Brown . nrl t la 'oort. eds . XeuriH-cup"11,'" ".' /•'•"'.s.'e-ity 
second word starts a clock mat is stopped by the verbal response of the participant. 
As soon as the participant starts to read aloud the word on the screen, the clock 
stops. This allows the measurement of the participant's reaction time. In one 
condition of the experiment participants see the target word (for example, "priest") 
preceded in time by a semantically related word ("pope"). In the other condition the 
first word is unrelated in meaning to the second word (for example, "horse"). The 
prediction of the network model is that seeing the word "pope" results in partial 
activation of the word "priest," through the connection between the concepts POPE 
and PRIEST. If "priest" appears on the screen immediately after "pope," the reading 
of "priest" should be faster than in isolation, since it was already partly activated due 
to the preceding word "pope." However, the word "horse" does not spread part of 
its activation to "priest," since the concepts HORSE and PRIEST are too far apart 
in the semantic network space to influence each other. So if "priest" is read 
immediately after "horse" this should not speed up the reading process. The results 
of this type of experiment are in line with the predictions from the network model. 
Subjects are a few tenths of a millisecond faster in reading "priest" preceded by 
"pope" than in reading "priest" preceded by "horse." This so-called priming effect 
suggests that information about the meaning of words is stored in memory as a 
network of connected pieces of information, and not as isolated packages of 
individual word meanings. 
3 The Neural Architecture 
The neural architecture specifies the spatio-temporal dynamics of the brain processes 
that convert the retinal image of, say, John Paul II into the speech sound [po:p]. That 
is, we have to specify which areas of the brain are activated during the processes 
involved, and how the concomitant activations are temporally orchestrated. 
Recently, the recording of the electrical activity of the brain has resulted in a 
fairly fine-grained estimation of the time course of the different processes involved. 
Electrical brain activity is usually recorded from a series of electrodes at the scalp. 
If these recordings are done time-locked to sensory, motor, or cognitive processes, 
scalp-recorded event-related brain potentials (ERPs) result, reflecting the sum of 
simultaneous post-synaptic activity of a large ensemble of neurons. The ERPs have 
a high temporal resolution, in the order of a few milliseconds. Based on the latency 
of these components, relevant information can be obtained about the time course of 
the underlying processes (see figure 2). 
Although for certain reasons10 ERPs have been mainly recorded by language 
researchers in relation to aspects of language comprehension, recent research has 
applied this techniques successfully in studying the production of speech." Without 
going into the details, on the basis of these and some other studies an educated guess 
can be made about the temporal dynamics of converting a visual image into an artic-
10 Cf. Peter Hagoort and M. van Turennout, "The Electrophysiology of Speaking. 
Possibilities of Event-related Potential Research on Speech Production," in Speech Produc-
tion: Motor Control, Brain Research and Fluency D/.$onferj,WouterHulstijn, Herman EM. 
Peters, and Pascal H.H.M. Van Lieshout, eds. (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1997), 351-61. 
" Miranda van Turennout, P. Hagoort, & CM. Brown, "Electrophysiological Evidence on 
the Time Course of Semantic and Phonological Processes in Speech Production," Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 23 (1997). 787-806, idem, 
"Brain Activity During Speaking: From Syntax to Phonology in 40 Milliseconds," Science 280 
(1998): 572 74. 
Figure 2. (After Steven A Hillyard and 
M. Kutas, "Electrophysiology ofCognitve 
Processing," Annual Review of 
Psychology 34 [1983]: 33-61.) Idealized 
waveform of a series of ERP com-
ponents that become visible after aver-
aging tfie EEG to repeated presen-
tations of a short auditory stimulus. In 
this figure, the EEG is recorded from 
one electrode, placed at a central mid-
line site on the scalp. Usually, averaging 
over a number of stimulus tokens is 
required to get an adequate signal-to-
noise ratio. Along the logarithmic time 
axis the early brainstem potentials 
(Waves l-vl), the midlatency compo-
nents (N0, P„, N„ P„ N„), the largely 
exogenous components (P,, N,, P2), 
and the endogenous, cognitive ERP 
components (Nd, N2, P3, Slow Wave) 
are shown. The components with a 
negative polarity are plotted upwards; 
the components with a positive polarity 
are plotted downwards. The exogenous 
components mainly reflect the physical 
stimulus characteristics (e.g., intensity, 
size, duration). The endogenous com-
ponents reflect in particular the cog-
nitive information processing conse-
quences of the stimulation of (one of) 
the sensory systems. 
EEG 
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milliseconds to perceive and categorize the retinal image as John Paul II.'3 The 
following activation of the concept POPE takes less than 200 milliseconds. It is 
followed by a cascade of retrieval processes. Activation of the syntactic features of 
pope (the lemma information) precedes the retrieval of the onset phoneme of the 
word [pop] by about 40 milliseconds. '4 Importantly, the information about a word's 
phonological form is not available at once, but accrues in a left-to-right order. For 
words of 3 phonemes (/p//o://p/), it takes maximally 80 milliseconds to retrieve the 
remaining segments once the word-initial phoneme is available.15 Since it takes 
about 600 milliseconds before articulation of the word [po:p] starts, the remaining 
time is necessary' for preparing (and partly executing) the articulatory motor program 
on the basis of the phonological information. 
Apart from answering the question about the time course, we need to specify the 
brain areas involved in the cascade of processing operations involved in speaking 
For this we have to rely either on evidence from lesion data or on measurements of 
brain activity with the help of modem brain imaging techniques such as Positron 
Emission Tomography (PET) and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). 
Lesion data come from patients who suffered from a stroke or brain tumor resulting 
in a language impairment. A precise analysis of the site and the size of the lesion on 
the one hand, and of the specific nature of the language impairment on the other, are 
used for making inferences about which areas of the brain subserve a particular 
aspect of language processing. For instance, lesions in the frontal cortex involving 
Broca' s area often result in an impairment in producing the correct sound pattern for 
the intended words, which suggests that this brain area is normally involved in, 
among other things, the assembling of a word's sound pattern. In this way, relating 
lesion site to impairment symptoms is used for assigning language functions to brain 
structures 
PET and fMRI measure hemodynamic signals. They enable the detection and 
visualization of functionally induced local blood flow changes (PET), or changes in 
blood oxygenation (fMRI), which are assumed to be correlated with the activation 
of nearby neural tissue.16 Roughly speaking, in this way the locus of neural activity 
related to cognitive processes is detected through a vascular filter. This implies that 
the temporal resolution of these techniques is inherently limited by the temporal 
dynamics of changes in blood flow or blood oxygenation, which is on the order of 
hundreds of milliseconds to a few seconds. This contrasts with the electrophysio-
logical recordings that are directly related to neural activity, and have a temporal 
resolution on the order of milliseconds. I lowever, the HRP measurements suffer from 
the so-called inverse problem, which makes it difficult to determine the localization 
of the electrical potentials that are picked up at the scalp. For the time being, only 
PET and fMRI provide measurements with the required spatial resolution. 
1! For more details, see Hagoort and van Turcnnout, "The Electrophysiology of Speaking." 
" Simon J. Thorpe, D Fize. & C. Marlot, "Speed of Processing in the Human Visual 
System," Nature 381 (1996) 520 22 
14 Van Turcnnout. Hagoort, & Brown. "Brain Activity During Speaking." 
1 * Van Turcnnout, I lagoort. & Brown, "Electrophysiological Evidence on the Time Course 
ot Semantic and Phonological Processes in Speech Production." 
"• For a general introduction, sec Marcus H. Raichle. "Visualizing the Mind "Scientific 
American, April 1994,36 42 
Recent years have seen an increasing number of PET and fMRI studies on 
language processing. In the absence of an animal model for language, we are 
strongly dependent on these new brain imaging techniques to see the brain in action 
during language tasks. The following logic underlies most brain imaging studies on 
language. The patterns of brain activation associated with tasks that tap a specific 
step (for example, the retrieval of lemma information) in the cascade of processes 
involved in speaking are compared with activation patterns associated with tasks in 
which this particular process is not involved. Through this comparison one can 
determine the brain areas that are more strongly activated during this step (lemma 
retrieval) in the overall process. The areas that are more strongly activated are 
assumed to be the areas that are particularly involved in this aspect of speaking. For 
instance, one can ask participants to read aloud words and pseudo-words. The latter 
are phonotactically legal letter strings, which do not happen to be existing words in, 
say, English. An example is the letter string floke. Everyone can read this word, but 
no one knows what it means. If one compares the English word smoke with the 
pseudo-word floke, the following two differences arise in the processes between 
seeing it written and saying it aloud. One difference is that for smoke the meaning 
gets accessed in the course of the process, whereas for floke we don't have a 
semantic representation in memory. In addition, we cannot retrieve a phonological 
code from memory for the pseudo-word_/7oAe. Instead, we have to assemble such a 
phonological code by converting the individual graphemes into the corresponding 
phonemes. If we measure the patterns of brain activity associated with reading aloud 
words and pseudo-words, the differences between the brain activity associated with 
words and pseudo-words are due to the retrieval of word meaning and phonology 
and/or the assembly of the phonological code for pseudo-words. To further segregate 
the brain activations related to meaning and phonology, other task comparisons are 
needed. In this way one can figure out which areas of the brain are differentially 
activated during the different steps in the process of speaking. Of course, there are 
also areas that are crucial to both tasks, since in addition to the differences there are 
also commonalities between reading words and pseudo-words. For instance, in both 
cases one sees activation in the primary visual cortex, since the whole reading 
process starts with the analysis of the visual patterns that fall on the retina. 
In a recent meta-analysis of more than fifty brain imaging studies on single word 
production, Peter Indefrey and W. Levelt summarized the current understanding of 
the neural circuitry underlying the cognitive activity that I described above.17 All core 
steps in the speaking process are subserved by areas in the left hemisphere, which 
is the language dominant hemisphere in the large majority of people. Selecting the 
appropriate concept for speaking (POPE) seems to involve the left middle temporal 
gyrus (see figure 3 for an overview). From there the activation spreads to Wernicke's 
area, which is pivotal in retrieving the phonological code of a word stored in 
memory. Wernicke' s area plays a crucial role in the whole network of language pro-
cessing by linking the lexical aspects of a word form to the widely distributed 
associations that define its meaning. This role is played by Wernicke's area in both 
language production and language comprehension.18 The lexical word form 
information is relayed to Broca's area in the left frontal cortex and/or the middle part 
| 
17 Peter Indefrey and W.J.M. Levelt, "The Neural Correlates of Language Production," in 
The Cognitive Neurosciences, 2nd edition, M. Gazzaniga, ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000). 










Figure 3. (After Peter Indefrey and 
W.J.M. Levelt, The Neural Cor-
relates of Language Production," in 
The Cognitive Neuroscfences, 2nd 
edi t ion, M. Gazzaniga, ed. 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000.) The 
different functional roles of cortical 
areas of the left hemisphere in 
single word production. The figure 
presents a lateral view of the left 
hemisphere. Different areas are 
involved in different aspects of the 
spoken-word production process. 
Lexical phonological 
code retrieval 
of the superior temporal lobe in the left hemisphere. These areas play a role in the 
conversion of the phonological codes in memory into phonological words from 
which the abstract articulatory program is derived. In the final phase of preparing for 
articulation and execution of articulation sensorimotor areas become activated, with 
the possible additional contribution of the supplementary motor area and the 
cerebellum (the latter two areas are not shown in figure 3). 
The conceptual knowledge that we have about the words of our language seems 
to be distributed more widely than the lexical lemma and form aspects, and is not 
restricted to the left hemisphere. Moreover, brain imaging and lesion studies on the 
semantics of concrete nouns indicate that perceptual and functional attributes of 
word meaning might be accessed through different parts of the brain with the 
perceptual attributes closer to the primary sensory areas and the functional attributes 
closer to the motor cortex.19 The transmodal cortex, the midtemporal cortex, and 
Wernicke's area are convergence zones or critical gateways for accessing relevant 
information that is represented in a distributed way.20 On the basis of the overall 
organization of the cortex, these areas are well suited to gate our distributed 
conceptual knowledge into one word form. That all we know about John Paul II 
converges onto the single word form [po:p] requires the involvement of brain areas 
that are specialized for binding distributed fragments of knowledge into a single 
output, in this case a single word form. 
Combining knowledge about the overall organization of the brain with 
information of specific patterns of language-related brain activity and its temporal 
dynamics allows us to gain insight into the neural organization of the uniquely human 
capacity for communication by means of natural language. Understanding this highly 
complex communication system requires a lot of skillful experimental research on 
detailed issues. Ultimately the understanding that we gain by doing this has wider 
ramifications for central questions concerning the human person. 
4 Language and the Theory of the Person 
A full theory of the person requires a specification of the ways in which the signals 
from such very different functional systems as language, memory, emotion, motor 
action, etc. with their own dedicated neural circuitry give rise to the sense of self and 
personhood. How exactly this happens is still largely unknown. How the brain solves 
the problem of binding the signals of these different systems into the sense of a 
unified self with continuity from past to future is an almost complete terra incognita 
for current cognitive neuroscience. Despite successful models of different cognitive 
systems, cognitive neuroscience still lacks an overarching theory of the person. 
However, even in the absence of a theory of the human person, it is a reasonable 
guess that such a theory would look quite different if we lacked language. Within the 
context of his schema theory, Michael Arbib (in this volume) argues that the self is 
a schema encyclopedia containing hundreds of thousands of schemas that a person 
uses to interpret and add new information to memoir The schema encyclopedia is 
used to "tell a story" to fit the new data. Not onlv are the metaphors used to describe 
19 For an overview, see Hleanor M. Saffian and A. Sholl, "Clues to the Functional and 
Neural Architecture of Word Meaning," in S'eurocognition of Language. Brown and 
Hagoort, eds.,241 72. 
Mesulam, "From Sensation to Cognition " 
the sense of self and person very often derived from the domain of language;21 it is 
also clear that language allows us to increase the size of our schema encyclopedia 
at an amazing rate. Although a cognitive neuroscience of language does not explain 
the content of our schema encyclopedia, it is indispensable in explaining the 
machinery that allows us to build up this large schema encyclopedia. No doubt, in 
the absence of our language capacities our sense of self and person would be 
substantially more limited and boring. In this regard language is a key component of 
a theory of the person, for which the input from a cognitive neuroscience of language 
is thus much needed. 
A similar story can be told about the relation between language and awareness. 
Although consciousness has also not been explained satisfactorily in terms of 
cognitive neuroscience, despite claims to the contrary,22 awareness stands a better 
chance Awareness is related to our ability to give phenomenal judgments and verbal 
reports about our sensations. Just as PET and fMRI allow a view of neural activity 
through a hemodynamic filter, awareness allows a view of consciousness through a 
linguistic filter Understanding the characteristics of the filter is also in this case of 
crucial importance to a better understanding of the central but still mostly evanescent 
phenomenon of consciousness. 
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